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In this paper we explore the ways in which mathematicians talk about explanation in their 
research papers. We analyze the use of the words explain/explanation (and various related 
words) in a large corpus of text containing research papers in both mathematics and physical 
sciences. We found that mathematicians do not frequently use this family of words and that their 
use is considerably more prevalent in physics papers than in mathematics papers. In particular, 
we found that physicists talk about explaining why disproportionately more often than 
mathematicians. We discuss some possible accounts for these differences. 
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The notion of explanation in mathematics has received a lot of attention in both mathematics 
education and the philosophy of mathematics. In mathematics education, scholars have been 
particularly interested in proofs that explain mathematical theorems (i.e. proofs that provide an 
insight into why a mathematical claim is true) and their role in the mathematics classroom (e.g. 
Hanna, 1990). Philosophers of mathematics have discussed at length possible equivalents for 
mathematics of existing philosophical theories of scientific explanation (e.g. Steiner, 1978). 
Some of these discussions bring to bear the extent to which explanation is relevant to the actual 
practice of mathematicians and often cite individual mathematicians’ views on mathematical 
explanation (more often than not that mathematician seems to be Henri Poincaré, Paul Halmos, 
or William Thurston). In this report we explore the extent to which mathematicians talk about 
explanation in their research papers, and the ways in which they do so. 
 
Literature review 
In an influential paper in mathematics education, de Villiers (1990) argued that proof serves 
several different roles in mathematics, that proof is not only used in mathematics as a way to 
verify results, to provide conviction of the truth of those results (see also Bell, 1976). One of 
those other functions of proof was to explain mathematical results, to provide an insight or 
understanding into why these results were true, as opposed to just evidence in support of that 
result. Hanna (1990) made a similar distinction in the context of the teaching and learning of 
mathematics, discussing the idea that certain proofs fulfilled this explanatory function better than 
others, to the point that among the set of all proofs one could identify proofs that explain why a 
theorem is true, while others simply demonstrate that a theorem is true. Mathematics educators 
have generally suggested that in the mathematics classroom, mathematical explanation should be 
an important, if not the primary role of proof (de Villiers, 1990; Hanna, 1990; Hersh, 1993).  
This distinction between proofs that explain and proofs that demonstrate has a longer history 
in the philosophy of mathematics. Steiner (1978) put forward a model of mathematical 
explanation, arguing that a mathematical proof could be better defined in terms of what he called 
a characterizing property of a concept in the theorem, as opposed to other alternative defining 
characteristics such as the abstractness or the generality of the proof. Steiner’s top-down 
approach to modeling mathematical explanation by providing a general definition of explanatory 
proof (and thus creating an absolute distinction between explanatory and non-explanatory 
proofs) has been criticized by other philosophers of mathematics. In particular, Hafner and 
Mancosu (2005) argued that ascribing explanatoriness to specific proofs should be done based on 
practicing mathematicians’ evaluations, not philosophers’ own intuitions (such as Steiner’s). The 
extent to which practicing mathematicians not only agree with philosophers’ characterization of 
mathematical explanation, but simply talk about explanation in their practice plays an important 
role in the general argument for the existence of explanation in mathematics (which not all 
philosophers believe). As such, it is not uncommon for a discussion of mathematical explanation 
to mention how much mathematicians talk about it. For example, Steiner claimed that 
“mathematicians routinely distinguish proofs that merely demonstrate from proofs which 
explain” (p.135), and Hafner and Mancosu (2005) supported their claim that mathematicians 
seek and value explanation in mathematics by presenting several examples of what they called 
“explanatory” talk in mathematical practice: passages of research mathematics papers in which 
the authors explicitly discuss the role of explanation in their own work. However, we do not 
currently have empirical evidence, other than these small selections of introspective accounts, 
about the extent to which talk about mathematical explanation is part of mathematical discourse. 
We believe one of the reasons this has not been studied at a larger scale may be methodological: 
a researcher would have to be able to process and analyze a large number of mathematical 
research papers or conversations among mathematicians. 
One method of studying mathematical discourse at such a scale is to use the techniques of 
corpus linguistics, a branch of linguistics that statistically investigates large collections of 
naturally occurring text, known as corpora. Methods developed by corpus linguists can be used 
to investigate many different types of linguistic questions. Here, we report a study that employs 
some of these techniques to address the following questions: to what extent do mathematicians 
discuss explanation in their research papers, how does it compare to the extent to which they 
discuss other important related notions (such as showing or proving given mathematical results), 
and how does it compare to discussions about explanation in other types of scientific discourse? 
 
Theoretical perspective 
Discussions about mathematical explanation tend to differentiate between mathematical 
explanations of other mathematics (i.e. mathematics X explains mathematics Y, or X is an 
explanatory proof of theorem Y), and mathematical explanations of physical phenomena (i.e. 
mathematics X explains physical phenomenon Y). Colyvan (2011) refers to these two types of 
explanation as intra-mathematical and extra-mathematical, respectively. Here we focus on intra-
mathematical explanations.  
Hafner and Mancosu (2005) further differentiated between two uses of intra-mathematical 
explanations: those that are “instructions” on how to master the tools of the trade (as in 
explaining how to employ a certain mathematical technique), and those that “call for an account 
of the mathematical facts themselves, the reason why” (p. 217). While Hafner and Mancosu 
considered the latter to be a “deeper” use of mathematical explanation, which is also the focus of 
the larger philosophical discussion around explanatory proofs, others have emphasized the 
importance of the former type of explanation in mathematical practice. For instance, Rav (1999) 
insisted that one of the main reasons mathematicians read proofs is because of all the 
mathematical know-how embedded in them, emphasizing the mathematical methodologies and 
problem solving strategies/techniques contained in proofs. According to Rav, “proofs are for the 
mathematician what experimental procedures are for the experimental scientist: in studying them 
one learns of new ideas, new concepts, new strategies—devices which can be assimilated for 
one's own research and be further developed.” (p. 20) Indeed, researchers have obtained 
empirical evidence (in both small scale interview studies and large scale surveys) that practicing 
mathematicians maintain that one of the main reasons they read proofs is to gain insights into 
how they can solve problems that they are working on (Weber & Mejía-Ramos, 2011, Mejía-
Ramos & Weber, 2014). 
An interesting question related to the specific ways in which mathematicians talk about 
explanation in their papers, relates to these two types of “explanatory” talk: to what extent do 
mathematicians discuss explanations of why a certain mathematical statement is true, compared 
to their talk about explanations of how to do something in mathematics?  
 
Methods 
One of the main ways in which mathematicians around the world communicate about 
mathematics is through research papers stored in the ArXiv. The ArXiv is an online repository of 
electronic preprints of scientific papers in the fields of mathematics, physics, astronomy, 
computer science, quantitative biology, quantitative finance, and statistics. These papers 
constitute a large corpus of scientific text that can be used to analyze mathematical discourse. 
We downloaded the bulk source files (mostly TeX/LaTeX) and converted the source code to 
plain text, which we could then analyze using standard software packages for corpus analysis. 
We then sorted these articles based on their primary and secondary subject classification (Alcock 
et al., 2017, discussed the details about the processing of these source files). All analyses 
reported here are based on a proper subset of this corpus, containing all mathematics and physics 
articles (based on their primary subject classification) uploaded in the first four months of 2009. 
This left us with 6988 mathematics papers (30,892,695 words) and 14861 physics papers 
(58,859,660 words). 
Results 
Frequency of explicit “explanatory” talk in mathematics papers 
Table 1 shows the frequencies of all words linguistically related to the word explain 
(henceforth explain-words) in our corpus of 6988 mathematics papers. Explain-words showed up 
4871 times in this set of papers, approximately once every 0.7 papers. While this certainly 
provides an existence proof of explicit “explanatory” talk in this corpus, it is not very surprising 
(it would very rare if no word based on the word explain showed up in these many mathematics 
papers). In order to get a sense of the extent to which these frequencies were high or low in this 
type of mathematical discourse, we compared them against the frequencies of words related to 
other important mathematical activities. 
Tables 2 presents the frequencies of words linguistically related to the notions of showing, 
solving, and proving, which were chosen based on their relevance in mathematical explanation. 
Measured against these other frequencies, mathematicians used explain-words rather 
infrequently. Indeed, mathematicians used explain-words in their papers approximately 11 times 
less frequently than show-words or solve-words and nearly 23 times less often than prove-words. 
One possibility is that explain-words are simply not used much in this kind of scientific 
discourse in general. Thus, even though the importance of scientific explanation is so obvious 
that it does not need to be justified by looking at “explanatory” talk in science, it could be the 
case that this type of talk is not that common in scientific research papers either. In order to test 
this hypothesis we studied the use of explain-words in the 14861 physics papers in our corpus 
(Table 3). Explain-words showed up 21305 times in this set of papers, approximately once every 
1.45 papers, or twice as often as they showed up in the mathematics papers. Thus, based on the 
comparison of the use of explain-words in mathematics and physics papers, it seems that 
mathematicians discuss explanations much more infrequently than physicists. 
Explain-words Frequency 
explain 1827 
explained 1690 
explanation 498 
explains 484 
explaining 175 
explanations 119 
explanatory 51 
unexplained 22 
unexplainable 4 
explainable 1 
Total 4871 
Table 1. Frequency of words related to explanation appearing in the mathematics papers. 
 
Show-words Frequency 
show 31691 
shows 12890 
shown 10235 
showed 2414 
showing 2129 
Total 59359 
  
 
 
 
Solve-words Frequency 
solution 25845 
solutions 15956 
solve 2204 
solving 1717 
solvable 1618 
solved 1342 
solves 1071 
solvability 429 
solver 145 
unsolved 95 
solvers 56 
nonsolvable 39 
unsolvable 32 
cosolvable 29 
equisolvable 18 
unsolvability 12 
Total 50608 
Prove-words Frequency 
proof 56452 
prove 29481 
proved 12842 
proves 4160 
proofs 3892 
proving 2661 
proven 1902 
provable 159 
reprove 58 
disprove 43 
provability 29 
reproved 29 
disproved 17 
unprovable 13 
unproven 12 
reproving 11 
disproving 10 
reproves 10 
prover 7 
unproved 7 
subproof 5 
disproof 4 
Total 111804 
 
Table 2. Frequencies of words linguistically related to the notions of showing, solving, and 
proving appearing in the mathematics papers. 
 
 
Explain-words Frequency 
explain 7768 
explained 6513 
explanation 3564 
explains 1601 
explaining 914 
explanations 675 
unexplained 177 
explanatory 62 
explainable 23 
unexplainable 8 
Total 21305 
Table 3. Frequency of words linguistically related to the notion of explaining appearing in 
the physics papers. 
 
Finally, the search for explain-words may be thought of as requiring an extremely explicit 
discussion of explanation, one that would leave unnoticed a significant amount of the 
“explanatory” talk in these papers. Hafner and Mancosu (2005) offered a list of eight 
expressions that they had found to be commonly used in the mathematics and philosophy of 
mathematics literature to describe the search for explanations. Table 4 presents these expressions 
along with the specific concordance search we made to investigate their prevalence in both the 
mathematics and physics papers, and the frequencies with which these alternative expressions 
appeared. We note that the total number of occurrences of these expressions is only about 10% 
of the total amount of explain-words in each set of papers (with disproportionately more 
occurrences of these expressions in the physics papers than the mathematics ones) and thus this 
analysis does not affect the finding made by only investigating the use of explain-words. 
 
Alternative expression Concordance search Mathematics  Physics 
"the deep reasons" deep* reason* 5 16 
"an understanding of the essence" understand* the essence 0 5 
"a better understanding" better understand* 161 767 
"a satisfying reason" satisfy* reason 0 0 
"the reason why" reason* why 312 924 
"the true reason" true reason 3 1 
"an account of the fact" an account of the fact 0 0 
"the causes of" cause* of 16 609 
 
Total 497 2322 
Table 4. Frequencies of alternative expressions of related to “explanatory” talk 
Explaining why vs. explaining how 
In order to investigate mathematicians’ discussion of explanations of why a certain 
mathematical statement is true (Hafner and Mancosu’s “deep” explanation), in comparison to 
their talk about explanations of how to do something in mathematics (related to Rav’s notion of 
mathematical know-how), we created a concordance of the corpus of papers and identified every 
instance an explain-word had been immediately followed by the words why or how (e.g. 
unexplained why, explanation how). We did this by searching the concordance for *expla* why 
and *expla* how, and checking that all results were indeed uses of explain-words. We then 
repeated the process with the corpus of physics papers. As, shown in Table 5, there is a clear 
difference between the ways that explain-words show up in the mathematics and the physics 
research papers. 
 
 
Mathematics Physics 
*expla* why 247 952 
*expla* how 458 353 
Total 705 1305 
Table 5. Frequencies of explain-words immediately followed by the words why or how in the 
mathematics and physics research papers 
  
We note that when taken together the total of *expla*-why and *expla*-how expressions 
were roughly as common in math papers as they were in physics papers, with approximately one 
of these expressions showing up every 10-11 papers in the corresponding set, and also a 
relatively small subset of the wider use of explain-words (roughly 14% and 6% of explain-word 
usage in mathematics and physics, respectively). However, the distribution of these two different 
types of expressions in the two sets of papers was significantly different (Fisher’s exact test, p < 
.001), with mathematicians using nearly twice as many *expla*-how expressions than *expla*-
why expressions, and physicists on the other hand using a little under three times as many 
*expla*-why expressions than *expla*-how expressions. 
 
Discussion 
Our analysis of “explanatory” talk in a large sample of mathematics papers does not offer 
support for a claim often made in the philosophy of mathematics: that this type of talk is 
prevalent in mathematical discourse. When compared to explicit discussion of other related 
mathematical practices (showing results, solving problems, and proving theorems), 
mathematicians do not seem to discuss explanation nearly as much. Furthermore, when 
compared to another scientific discourse, we found that mathematical discourse contains only a 
fraction of “explanatory” talk as research papers in physics. Indeed, we believe these findings 
suggest that the prevalence of “explanatory” talk in mathematical discourse has been widely 
exaggerated. 
Furthermore, by analyzing the frequency with which variations of the expressions explain 
why and explain how occur in mathematics and physics research papers, we found that, to the 
extent to which they engage in “explanatory” talk, mathematicians seem to be much more 
interested in discussing explanations of how to do something in mathematics, than in 
explanations of why things are the way they are in mathematics. In physics we found the 
situation to be the opposite. This is particularly interesting given mathematics educators’ and 
philosophers’ of mathematics preoccupation with the type of intra-mathematical explanations of 
the form X explains why Y (where X and Y are mathematical assertions), and particularly with 
the notion of explanatory proofs (in which proof X explains why theorem Y is true). This focus 
may have been inherited from the more traditional study of the notion of scientific explanation, 
which is not only naturally concerned with this type of explanations (the desire to explain the 
real world is full of why-questions), but according to our findings may also be more commonly 
discussed in scientific discourse in terms of answers to why-questions. However, our findings 
suggest that this focus may also be misguided for those interested in studying the notion of 
mathematical explanation as it more commonly occurs in the discourse of professional 
mathematicians. Indeed, as suggested by Rav (1999), it seems that when it comes to proofs and 
explanations, mathematicians are primarily interested in learning how to solve other problems, 
possibly over learning the reasons why some mathematical results hold true. 
Now, one must be careful about several inferential jumps made in this kind of analysis. First, 
while the ArXiv may well be the largest, most widely used repository of this type of preprints 
and postprints in the world, we have analyzed a very specific type of mathematical discourse, 
leaving open the possibility that studies of mathematical discourse in others settings 
(conversational or other digital communications) could lead to contrasting findings. Second, we 
have analyzed these research papers for a limited type of “explanatory” talk, one required to 
contain explain-words or a limited number of alternative, related expressions. While this was an 
obvious place to start to investigate “explanatory” talk in mathematical discourse, it is certainly 
possible that the analysis of other expressions related to mathematical explanation may skew our 
results. These limitations of the present study indicate clear avenues for future empirical research 
on mathematical explanation. 
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